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The Arrogance of International Lawyers
Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson
At the Spring Luncheon of the Section of
International and Comparative Law of the
American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.,
May 24, 1968
Joe C. Barrett, Chairman of the International and Comparative Law
Section, Jonesboro, Arkansas, presiding.
Introduction of Dean Acheson by Clifford J. Hynning, Vice Chair-
man of the Division of International Law and Editor-in-Chief of
The International Lawyer, Washington, D.C.:
I will not take very much time in introducing our guest because
all of you know him. I will just call your attention to the pads of
yellow paper on your tables which can be used to frame written
questions which may be handled by Mr. Acheson after his speech, if
time permits.
Second, I want to read a brief quotation from a great Greek
who described Pericles as "one who, I believe, is second to no man
either in knowledge of the proper policy or in the ability to expound
it and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest man." I give
you Dean Acheson.
MR. ACHESON: Five years ago I was bold enough to scold a meeting
of this sort about what I call the arrogance that international law
seems to instill in its addicts. To be sure, law in general does this
to lawyers in general. One can be tolerantly amused at the venera-
tion which craftsmen in any craft have for the materials of their
craft. The cobbler murmurs, "There's nothing like leather!" But he
is too modest to envision as man's highest earthly condition the Rule
of Leather. Yet the lawyer does not blush to proclaim it to be the
Rule of Law. As he describes it, the rule of law seems to be gover-
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nance by disembodied principle without the intervention of human hand
or voice. Even his own not unimportant role at the bar and on the
bench the lawyer turns into the mere voice of the oracle inspired
by the Law Principle itself. This miracle finds its most mystical ex-
pression in the doctrine of Natural Law, which makes it the efflux
of the universe, flowing forth from the Godhead. The disciple of
Natural Law seemed to Justice Holmes like the knight of romance
to whom it was not enough that you agreed that his lady was a very
nice girl. If you did not admit that she was the best that God ever
made or would make, you must fight. Ordinary lawyers, who work
around the temple of Apollo feeding the oracle questions, some of
which are loaded, arguing with it and among themselves, "cussing"
its pronouncements that go against them, take a more earthy view of
law. When former Justice (as he was then) Charles Evans Hughes
bluntly-and, perhaps, too "Delphically"-said that the Constitution
is what the Supreme Court says it is, the lawyers were not too shocked,
although they pretended that they were.
Those who devote themselves to international relations in for-
eign offices at what is disparagingly called "the working level" are
understandably and wisely reticent about the role of law. This, how-
ever, is not true of academicians who write about it and teach it.
Undeterred by the discipline of adversary procedure or by the test of
judgment in contested application, motivated by the highest prin-
ciples and often spurred by a gift for imaginative rhetoric, some of
them recall Disraeli's description of Gladstone as "intoxicated by the
exuberance of his own verbosity." I hasten to add that it was the Bar
Association en masse, and not the International and Comparative
Law Section of it, that voiced the most delusive of all slogans-"World
peace through world law."
Those of whom I complain are not the peddlers of spurious
panaceas for peace, not those who are overimpressed with the role
of international law, but those who would impose upon states in the
name of law their own subjective conceptions of justice. As is so
often the case with the righteous, deeply convinced of the righteous-
ness of their cause, their impulse is to "snatch the knotted cord from
the hand of God and deal out murderous blows." These blows are
usually directed against the weak by suborning the subjectivities of
the strong. This process also furnishes the fig leaf of legal respecta-
bility for otherwise naked aggression.
Such support was given to the action of the United Nations
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Security Council in calling for economic sanctions against Rhodesia
and to the attacks upon the World Court's decision dismissing the
complaint in the Southwest Africa case. The viciousness of the sub-
stitution of the subjective conception of justice for law in these instances
is that in both cases it provides means for collective aggression, in both
it degrades international adjudication, and in both it departs from the
basic conception of international law. This is that it is inter national,
between sovereign states, based upon accepted practices and agree-
ments of sovereigns. In this latter respect it differs basically from
the law taught by the international lawyers' other academic colleagues.
To strike at this concept of agreed limitations on sovereignty is to
strike at confidence in judicial honesty and restraint, which alone can
lead to the slow development of international law from its primitive
state.
It will surprise some of my fellow citizens, though hardly any-
one here today, to be told that the United States is engaged in an
international conspiracy, instigated by Britain, and blessed by the
United Nations, to overthrow the government of a country that has
done us no harm and threatens no one. This is barefaced aggression,
unprovoked and unjustified by a single legal or moral principle.
The charge that Britain brings against Rhodesians is one that
George III once brought against Americans and sought unsuccess-
fully to enforce by arms. It was that the Colonies felt it necessary,
as Mr. Jefferson put it, "to dissolve the political bands which [had]
connected them with another [people], and to assume among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws
of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." However, two academics
writing in the American Journal of International Law have taken a
quite different view. They say:
• . . In the most fundamental sense, the assertion of inde-
pendence at a time and by means which the authoritative organs
of the international community had decided would precipitate
a threat to the peace of the surrounding region and the world
was an act of irresponsibility in violation of the most basic
policies of the Charter for the maintenance of international
order. '
Where authorities differ so widely further inquiry and judgment are
indicated.
1 Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern," 62 A.J.I.L. 1, at. p. 12
(1968).
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In the first place, was independence so broad a step for Rhodesia
to take? While Britain had asserted sovereignty over the Rhodesian
countryside since the latter part of the last century when Cecil Rhodes
started developing it, Whitehall had never administered government
there, nor provided funds or forces for its defense. All this had been
done locally, first under the British South Africa Company chartered
to Cecil Rhodes and his associates, and after 1923 under the Consti-
tution of that date, established after the electorate had voted for self-
government as against incorporation in the Union of South Africa.
In fact, so self-governing was Rhodesia that between 1935 and 1953
(the beginning of the Federation) the Rhodesian Prime Minister sat
as an equal in the meetings of Prime Ministers, first of the Empire and
later of the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister of the Federation
(with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia) took his place until its
dissolution in 1964. Thereafter the Prime Ministers of her two asso-
ciates, now independent states, sat, but Rhodesia's was excluded be-
cause of the dispute which then arose.
Turning to this dispute and the circumstances of the Rhodesian
assertion of independence, that country had had since the beginning
of its history an electorate based on adult male suffrage, later extended
to women, with modest literacy and property requirements. These
qualifications are those adopted in this and other countries during
early stages of representative government by a people among whom
education was the exception, and experience, cultural or otherwise,
was unequal. When white settlement began in 1890, Rhodesia was
sparsely populated by very primitive people. The great bulk of its
present population, white and black, has immigrated since then,
attracted by opportunity and security of life and property available
there. The Rhodesian Constitutional Commission was well aware of
this situation:
• . . the Shona, the Ndebele and the Europeans were all
in turn [im]migrants, conquerors and settlers and all now know
no other home. Thus they have established for themselves and
their successors the right to remain in the country in perpetuity,
a right which they have every intention of exercising.
• . . For the[se] reasons . . . Rhodesia is the permanent
and rightful home of peoples of different origins and back-
grounds, and does not belong to one race or ethnic group
alone. .. .. 2
2Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1968 (Government Printer,
Salisbury, Rhodesia), Chapter 2, p. 10.
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What did the Commission see as the end of the matter? A pro-
gressive extension of the franchise, but not majority rule. "For a
time which cannot be measured by clock or calendar," Europeans
would exercise the more authoritative voice at national government
level, and Africans would have a voice that must be allowed in-
creasing, but not limitless, power. The ultimate solution recommended
was based on racial parity of representation as most likely to produce
immediate and long-term confidence and stability. This was not
everyone's cup of tea; neither was it everyone's business; nor was it
apartheid. It was a matter relating solely to the internal affairs of
Rhodesia-in which the United Nations was forbidden by its Charter
to meddle-and to the political relation between Rhodesia and the
United Kingdom. When the latter sought to impose a majority rule,
in time measured by the calendar, Rhodesia severed the bands that
bound them.
It was this act and Rhodesia's assumption, among the powers
of the earth, of the separate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitled her which the General Assembly
and the Security Council said created a situation that threatened the
peace. While Rhodesia threatened no one, the idea was that her
independence, "if continued in time," would disturb the peace because,
apparently, someone would attempt to terminate it, because of dis-
approval of Rhodesia's long-established internal legislation on suf-
frage. The General Assembly spelled this out in its Resolution of
November 5, 1965, when it "reaffirm[ed] the right of the people of
Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence [-the very thing
which was now threatening the peace-] and recognize[d] the legiti-
macy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights." What sort
of rights? Their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. [The
resolution went on that the United Nations "solemnly warn[ed] the
present authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in its capacity of administering
Power, that the United Nations will oppose any declaration of inde-
pendence which is not based on universal adult suffrage."] '
How fortunate were the American colonies to have no United
Nations to confront in 1776! I need hardly remind you that our
Constitution had nothing to say about adult universal suffrage but
3 General Assembly Resolution No. 2022, 60 A.J.I.L. 922-23.
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did have a few pregnant paragraphs continuing the institution of
slavery.'
Of course, no one in the United Nations really believed that
Britain, which had been handing out independence in wholesale lots,
would fight Rhodesia, or that any African state would take on the
prickly job.
Perhaps I might pause for a moment to remind you of the
present situation. As everybody knew, this blockade of Rhodesia has
not worked. Therefore, Her Majesty's government in accordance with
that universal principle which seems to instigate all fanatics that one
must redouble effort on finding oneself on the wrong road, has asked
the United Nations to extend the blockade and our African friends
have raised their cry that the British should come out of the bushes
and gain enough courage to fight Rhodesia by arms. The point I am
making here is that this highly theoretical and imaginative threat was
not posed by Rhodesia but against Rhodesia. From this premise only
the most Humpty-Dumpty reasoning could move to the conclusion
that Rhodesia should be punished by international action aimed at
overthrowing her government and ending her independence. The
reasoning provided by academic authority is hardly less curious. Here
it is:
• . . In the contemporary intensely interdependent world,
peoples interact not merely through the modalities of collabora-
tive or combative operations but also through shared subjec-
tivities-not merely through the physical movements of goods
and services or exercises with armaments, but also through
communications in which they simply take each other into
account. . . . Much more important than the physical move-
ments are the communications which people make to each
other. In the case of Rhodesia, the other peoples of Africa have
regarded themselves as affected by the authoritarian and racist
policies of the Rhodesian elites .... -'
In simpler and nonpejorative terms, they do not like Rhodesia's
elective system. Subjectivity means the quality or condition of view-
ing things exclusively through the medium of one's own mind or
individuality; the condition of being absorbed in one's personal feel-
ings, thoughts, concerns, etc. The term also means personal bias,
emotional predisposition, the substitution of perception for reality, etc.
4 U.s. Constitution, Art. I, §§ 2 (clause 3) and 9 (clause 1); Article IV,
§ 2 (clause 3).
McDougal and Reisman, loc. cit., pp. 1, 12.
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The authors may mean any or all of those senses. But the point is
that what we have here is the idea that law is only a mirror of the
beholder's emotional condition at the moment.
Consider a situation which wounds shared subjectivities of a
wholly different nature and ones with which we may be less in sym-
pathy. Within the month the nations of Eastern Europe have met in
Moscow to consider their shared dislike of what they regard as the
deviationist, antidemocratic, indeed, bourgeois policies of the Czecho-
slovakian elites in permitting a modicum of personal liberty in that
country. Rumor even carries reports of Soviet troop movements near
the Czech border. Suppose that, instead of repeating its armed inter-
ventionist tactics in Hungary in 1956, the Soviet Union should appeal
to the Security Council to stop this Czech assault on the shared sub-
jectivities of communist states. I suppose that the authors would
expect it to direct us all to cease building bridges to the East and
refurbish our embargoes against trade with a renegade communist
state.
Consider, too, our own parlous position in the face of this
doctrine. Does any country in the world so widely offend shared
subjectivities as we do? Ask General de Gaulle, Mao Tse Tung,
Ho Chi Minh, Mrs. Gandhi, Castro, the Arabs. Even the South
Vietnamese are not too sure. And what about our own subjectivities
should our own brain child, the United Nations, expound on what
we had done to theirs. Somehow this romantic interpretation of the
Charter does not make it read like the last best hope for peace on
earth.
Nevertheless, ridiculous as it appears on analysis, much as it
recalls Cicero's observation that there is nothing so absurd but some
philosopher has said it, the fact remains that it rationalizes an attempt
to overthrow a government that has done us no harm and threatens
no harm to any state. Is participation in such an assault desirable
foreign policy? Is this cabal what Mr. Hull thought was being pre-
pared at Dumbarton Oaks or what the Senate almost unanimously
ratified?
Of course, clever men will attempt to use any instrument to
accomplish indirectly what they cannot do directly; but we should
have known better than to agree to it had we not been bemused by
substituting ideas that appealed to us as ethical for the plain engage-
ments of sovereign states. In the Charter the subscribing sovereigns
undertook not to use force as an instrument of policy in their inter-
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national relations. By a process that cannot be dignified as reasoning,
force applied against another state has now been equated with the
failure to adopt internally the principle of universal suffrage plus the
egalitarian doctrine of equally weighted votes as announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Baker v. Carr. And this-
mark you!-is only the first application of that new doctrine of inter-
national lawyers-the sovereign equality of shared subjectivities.
This doctrine is allied in its harmful and disruptive potentialities
with the doctrine of liability without injury, averted only by the casting
vote of the President of the World Court in the decision of the South-
west Africa case. An analogy to this case would have been an orig-
inal action, in the Supreme Court of the United States, say by the
State of Michigan, activated by the policies of its former governor
in his State Department days, against the State of Virginia to correct
the school situation once said to prevail in King William County.
If the Court had found that neither the State of Michigan nor any of
its citizens had been injured, its precedents (which it might or might
not have followed) would have required it to dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction. This is what the World Court found and did.
The wounding of shared subjectivities would, of course, furnish juris-
diction for the Court on the same reasoning as for the Security Council.
Contemplating the possibilities, I am moved to salute the shade
of Senator Tom Connally and thank him for his reservation, which
at the time I regretted, providing that our acceptance of the World
Court's jurisdiction should not apply to disputes with regard to
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States as determined by the United States.
One of the troubles of the troubled age in which we live is that
too many people are trying to achieve harmony of interest by forcing
everyone to harmonize with them. Conscience used to be an inner
voice of self-discipline; now it is a clarion urge to discipline others.
It took a long time to develop the international precept that peace
would be furthered by governments' having respect for each other's
autonomy. That should apply to them when acting in concert. This
is the notion embedded in Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter.
Whatever mistakes they may otherwise have made, the draftsmen of
the Charter, at least, did not intend to open the way for endless con-
flict through unbridled impulses to reform. The new romantic impulse
is to overthrow that wise inhibition in favor of a compulsion to re-
shape the world to fit all sorts of shared subjectivities.
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Another thought also occurs. Perhaps, if the meek are to inherit
the earth, they might consider adding a clause to the litany. It could
follow "From all blindness of heart; from pride, vainglory, and hypoc-
risy; from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness" and
would add "and from the United Nations Charter as distorted by
professors of international law,
Good Lord, deliver us."
Questions for Mr. Acheson
MR. HYNNING: Thank you very much, Mr. Acheson, for a most
interesting, thought-provoking, and entertaining address. If there
are any questions, would you please send them forward to the rostrum.
Pending one coming up, I might pose one myself to Mr. Acheson. I
wonder how the doctrine of shared subjectivities would apply to the,
state of Israel?
MR. ACHESON: Sir, you add new horror! I suppose that next to
ourselves, the state of Israel has offended more shared subjectivities
than anyone in the world and this is the very heart of the Arab objec-
tion to the state of Israel. Its mere existence, as Mr. Nasser says, is
an offence. How you do deal with that, of course, is fairly clear and
that is by ending one's existence. This seems to me to preclude com-
promise of the Middle-Eastern problem.
MR. HYNNING: We have a question that is addressed, I suppose, to
the issue of mini-states. How does a small minority of people of
Rhodesia assume to set up a government so as to claim rights of
sovereignty? I suppose this is a question of figures in some way.
MR. ACHESON: The question as asked is, of course, one which is
historically quite silly. A very small minority of the people of the
United States set up its sovereignty. This I suppose always happens.
A minute minority of the inhabitants of Athens set up their state,
and so on. Figures have nothing to do with setting up sovereignty.
Perhaps what the author of the question was really talking about is
a thing that our State Department, in one of its more misguided
efforts, has gotten off to the world, which is that Rhodesia is not a
state. Why is it not a state? Because other states say it isn't a state.
This obviously raises the question, when did the first state become a
state? It is quite absurd if one gets on a little further into the sub-
stance of the matter. It's like saying the original declaration of the
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rights of man had nothing to do with women. Well, one disposes
of that by quoting Cicero. I think we've said enough about that.
MR. HYNNING: Another question, what can we as American
attorneys do to restore original meaning to the U.N. Charter and shed
the "power" that U.N. has arrogated to itself with regard to domestic
policies of individual states?
MR. ACHESON: I should answer that question by saying that when
something which is stated appears to you to be not only untrue but
absurd that you say so. This is really the role of the American lawyer
since de Tocqueville described it in 1832. Too often, most legal
opinion appears to be expressed by journals, in other words by stu-
dents and professors. I think what needs to be heard is the voice
of practicing lawyers who are sensible people dealing with practical
problems.
(Editor's Note: See Communications, infra, pp. 729-743, for "Reply
to Mr. Acheson.")
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